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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ALAN KILSTROM, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 981388-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides in pertinent part: 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1998) provides: 
76-6-501. Forgery—"Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose 
to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is 
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his 
authority or utters any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, 
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so 
that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or 
utterance purports to be the act of another, whether 
the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to 
have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered 
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a 
copy of an original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes 
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any 
other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, 
badges, trademarks, money, and any other symbols of 
value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other 
instrument or writing issued by a government or any 
agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any 
other instrument or writing representing an interest 
in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest 
in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. 
Kihlstrom's motion to dismiss based on insufficient evidence at the 
close of the State's case in chief? 
Standard of review. 
We will affirm a trial court's denial of a 
motion to dismiss based upon insufficient evidence "if, 
upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can 
be reasonably drawn from it, we conclude that some 
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find 
that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt." State v. Dibello, 780 P. 2d 1221, 1225 
(Utah 1989). Accord State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 
(Utah 1986); State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah 
Ct.App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
State v. Davis, 349 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 32 (Utah App. 1998) . 
Preserved below by motion to dismiss at R. 124:22-7. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in giving instruction 
22, which relieved the State of the obligation of proving that Mr. 
Kihlstrom knew the check was forged or had an intent to defraud? 
Standard of review. 
We review the trial court's instructions to the 
jury for correctness, affording no deference. Ames v. 
Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993). When 
conducting this analysis, we review the instructions in 
their entirety to determine whether the instructions, 
when considered as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on 
the applicable law. Id. "We reverse a trial court's 
decision on the basis of an instruction improperly 
submitted to the jury only where the party challenging 
the propriety of the instruction 'demonstrates prejudice 
stemming from the instructions viewed in the aggregate.! 
" icL (quoting State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah 
App.1991), rev'd on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 
1993)). 
Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah App. 1996). 
Preserved below at R. 124:68, --95-6. 
3. Whether the prosecutor committed prejudicial 
misconduct in mischaracterizing Mr. Kihlstrom1s prior testimony, 
and presenting unsupported innuendo? 
Standard of review. In assessing the prosecutor's 
questions and argument, this court will make an original 
determination of whether the prosecutor brought improper 
information to the jury's attention, and whether such information 
probably influenced the jurors. State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 
(Utah 1984) . If this court views the evidence of guilt to be 
ambiguous or in conflict with other evidence, this court will "more 
closely scrutinize the conduct." Id. When objections are not made 
at trial, appellate review is under a "plain error" standard. 
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State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 868 
P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
Preserved below at R. 124:47 (mischaracterizing prior 
testimony). The prosecutor's unsupported innuendo was presented at 
R. 124:40. Unsupported innuendo, while reviewed under the plain 
error standard, 
is a circumstance "when an error not readily apparent to 
the court" does not raise an "insurmountable barrier to 
review." State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 
1989) . . . . Unless we apply this exception, this type 
of error would always escape review under the obviousness 
requirement. 
State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah App.), cert denied. 868 
P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
4. Whether cumulative error mandates reversal? 
Standard of review. Reversal is appropriate if the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines confidence that 
a fair trial was had. State v. Dunn, 850 P. 2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 
1993) . 
This is purely an appellate issue, and no preservation is 
required beyond that of each individual error asserted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Kihlstrom was charged by information with passing a 
forged check in violation of the forgery statute, stemming from a 
check he cashed in April, 1997. R. 4-6. Jury trial was held on 
March 30, 1998. See transcripts, R. 125 (A.M.), 124 (P.M.). Over 
Mr. Kihlstrom1s objection, the trial court gave instruction 22. R. 
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86 (instruction); 124:68, -95-6 (objection). The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty. R. 94. Mr. Kihlstrom was sentenced by Judge 
Ronald E. Nehring to serve zero to five years in prison. R. 102-3 
(Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, attached as Addendum B) . This 
appeal ensued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At trial, the State introduced the check in question into 
evidence as Exhibit 1. R. 124:19 (offered), --20 (received). The 
face amount of the check was $1346.28. See Exhibit l.1 The check 
was written on an account of Furst Construction. R. 125:101; 
Exhibit 1. The check was made payable to Alan "Kilstrom. "2 R. 
124:9, Exhibit 1, see also R. 124:37. Nothing about the check 
indicated there was any problem with it. R. 124:11, see also 
Exhibit 1. 
Bill Prokopis is the proprietor of Bill's Lounge. R. 
124:3-4, --6. The check was cashed by his employee, Karl Anderson. 
R. 124:9. In accordance with standard procedures, a fingerprint 
and driver license information were obtained at the time the check 
was indorsed by Mr. Kihlstrom, as well as a social security number. 
XA copy of the check from trial counselfs file is attached as 
Addendum A. The actual trial exhibits cannot be located. Neither 
the third district court clerk nor the appellate clerk have any 
record of ever receiving the exhibits from the trial court. The 
court file at R. 51 indicates that 5 exhibits were received. The 
trial in this case occurred just prior to the move to the new 
Mattheson Courthouse, and one must assume that somewhere in the 
move the exhibits have been misplaced. 
2This spelling error seems to be common. The State made the 
identical error in charging Mr. Kihlstrom. 
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R. 124:4-5, --6-8, --9-10. The check was returned unpaid. R. 
124:4. Furst Construction was then notified. R. 124:11. Vern 
Beesley, a Deputy Sheriff assigned to the crime lab, testified that 
the fingerprint on the check came from Mr. Kihlstrom's right index 
finger. R. 124:12-19. 
John Johanssen, the corporate controller and financial 
officer of Furst Construction (R. 125:96), testified that the 
company had some checks stolen. R. 125:98, --103. In the fall of 
1996 about 12 of these checks showing up on their bank statement as 
having cleared the bank. R, 125:98. Furst Construction put a stop 
payment order on the 18,000 series of checks, R. 125:99, --104, and 
closed the account, R. 125:99. Exhibit 1 is from the 18,000 series 
of checks. R. 125:104, Exhibit 1 (check number is 18871). Only 
three persons were authorized signatories on the checks. R. 
125:100. The signature of the maker on Exhibit 1 did not belong to 
any of the authorized signatories. R. 125:100. Mr. Kihlstrom 
never worked for Furst Construction or received a check from them. 
R. 125:101. Mr. Kihlstrom was not one of the two or more 
individuals prosecuted for forging the stolen checks from that 
series. R. 125:103. 
At this point, the State rested. R. 124:20. Mr. 
Kihlstrom's motion to dismiss was denied. R. 124:22-27. 
Mr. Kihlstrom testified that during the spring of 1997, 
he worked as a self-employed mechanic at his home. R. 124:28. A 
friend referred Mike Workman to him, and Workman solicited him to 
work on several vehicles. R. 124:29. Workman had Mr. Kihlstrom 
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replace a head gasket and water pump in a full-size Chevy crew cab 
pickup, which had signs on the side and appeared to be a 
construction truck. R. 124:29-31. Mr. Kihlstrom had the truck for 
about a week. R. 124:31. Workman paid Mr. Kihlstrom with the 
check at issue, which had already been filled out. R. 124:32-3. 
A couple days later Mr. Kihlstrom cashed the check at Bill's 
Lounge. R. 124:33. Mr. Kihlstrom presented his Wyoming commercial 
driver's license as identification. R. 124:34-5. Nothing about 
the transaction seemed to be out of the ordinary. R. 124:35-6. 
Mr. Kihlstrom denied any knowledge that the check was stolen, or 
that the maker's signature was forged. R. 124:46, --52. 
Over objection, R. 124:68, --95-6, the trial court gave 
instruction 22, which provided: 
Intent to defraud is simply a purpose to use a 
false writing as if it were genuine in order to gain some 
advantage. 
A false writing has such an obvious tendency to 
accomplish fraud that you may infer such intent from the 
mere creation of an instrument that is false. 
R. 86. 
In cross-examining Mr. Kihlstrom, the prosecutor 
questioned him in part as follows: 
Q Okay. When did you realize that the police 
were looking for you in connection with this check? 
A When I did -- I didn't know anything about this 
until I was arrested on a different warrant. 
Q Well, on this particular case weren't you aware 
in late May or early June that Detective Doug Townsend 
wanted to talk to you in connection with this check? 
A No. 
Q He didn't go to your house? Weren't you living 
with a young woman at the time, a Jenny, is it Tangloon? 
A Tangloon. No, I wasn't, not at that time. 
Q She didn't tell Officer Townsend [sic] that 
they were looking for you in late May or early June? 
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A I haven't talked to her for over a year. 
Q Well, where were you in late May and early 
June? Were you out of state or in state? 
A I was in state. 
Q You were here. Were you ever trying to hide 
from the police in connection with this case? 
A Not at all. 
Q And you say you never learned about the check 
until when? 
A December. 
Q December of 1997? 
A Yes, sir. 
R. 124:40-41. The prosecutor never offered any evidence in support 
of this unsupported innuendo. 
Later, the prosecutor mischaracterized Mr. Kihlstrom's 
prior testimony: 
Q How many times did Mike Workman pay you? 
A Two times. 
Q Two times? 
A Yes. 
Q Didn't you just tell the jury it was only one 
time? 
A No. 
MS. REMAL: Objection, Your Honor. That's a 
mischaracterization of the evidence. He answered the 
questions that counsel[] asked. 
THE COURT: Overruled. It's cross-examination. 
Q Didn't you just a few minutes ago tell us that 
that was the only time he ever paid you? 
A No, I didn't. 
Q So now he did pay you twice? 
A Yeah. 
R. 124:47. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Kihlstrom's motion 
to dismiss at the close of the State's case in chief. The State 
presented no evidence that Mr. Kihlstrom knew the check was forged, 
or that he had an intent to defraud. The State only established 
that Mr. Kihlstrom negotiated a check made out to him, and that 
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that check later proved to be a forgery. Having failed to 
establish the criminal mens rea, the denial of his dismissal motion 
should be reversed and a judgment of acquittal entered. 
The trial court erred in giving instruction 22, which 
permitted the jury to infer an intent to defraud on the part of an 
utterer from the mere fact that the instrument he uttered is a 
forgery. This inference is irrational and arbitrary, in violation 
of due process. This instruction had the effect of relieving the 
State of its burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt, 
allowing conviction for innocent action. This Court should reverse 
and order a new trial. 
The prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in 
offering unsupported innuendo and mischaracterizing Mr. Kihlstrom's 
prior testimony. This misconduct adversely impacted Mr. 
Kihlstrom!s credibility, which was necessary for his defense of 
being a holder in due course with no knowledge of the forgery. 
Absent this misconduct, a better result is likely. This Court 
should reverse and order a new trial. 
Cumulatively, the instructional error and prosecutorial 
misconduct undermine confidence in the verdict, necessitating a new 
trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
MR. KIHLSTROM'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CLOSE 
OF THE STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF. 
Fully marshalled, the State's evidence in its case in 
chief showed the following: 
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1. Some unidentified person or persons stole checks from 
Furst Construction Co. R. 125:98, --103. 
2. Some unidentified person or persons made out one of the 
stolen checks to Alan Kihlstrom, and affixed a maker's signature to 
the check. See Exhibit 1; R. 125:100 (check not signed by 
authorized signatory). 
3. Nothing about the check indicated there was any problem 
with it. R. 124:11. 
4. Alan Kihlstrom came into possession of the stolen and 
forged check. (Reasonable inference from his later action of 
cashing the check.) 
5. Alan Kihlstrom cashed the check at Bill's Lounge in a 
nondeceptive, commercially reasonable fashion including indorsing 
his own name on the back of the check, providing a state-issued 
picture ID, and providing a thumbprint. See Exhibit 1; R. 124:4-
10. 
6. Payment on the check was stopped. See Exhibit 1; R. 
124:4. 
There is nothing in this evidence indicating that Mr. 
Kihlstrom forged the check, or that he knew the check was a 
forgery. 
The forgery statute provides: 
76-6-501. Forgery—"Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose 
to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is 
facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his 
authority or utters any such altered writing; or 
10 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, 
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so 
that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or 
utterance purports to be the act of another, whether 
the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to 
have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered 
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a 
copy of an original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes 
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any 
other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, 
badges, trademarks, money, and any other symbols of 
value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other 
instrument or writing issued by a government or any 
agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any 
other instrument or writing representing an interest 
in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest 
in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1998). 
Utah!s forgery statute incorporates the elements of two 
common law crimes: common law forgery, and uttering a forged 
instrument. Without question, someone committed a common law 
forgery here. The check was completed, with a forged maker's 
signature. " [T] he essence of the crime of forgery is not the end, 
i.e., what is obtained by the forgery, but the means, e.g., by 
signing the name of another with intent to defraud." State v. 
Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 391 n.14 (Utah App. 1997). The State did 
not allege or prove that Mr. Kihlstrom forged the check. He can 
only be guilty of a crime for his own actions. 
The essence of the crime charged against Mr. Kihlstrom 
was at common law called uttering a forged instrument. A "check" 
qualifies as a writing under subsection (2)(a). As for the actus 
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reus, there is little question that Mr. Kihlstrom transferred or 
uttered the check to Bill's Lounge. Significantly, nothing Mr. 
Kihlstrom did purported to be anything other than his own action. 
When he transferred or uttered the check, he purported to do so as 
Al an Kihlstrom. He signed his own name, provided his own 
identification, and affixed his own fingerprint. He merely 
"negotiated"3 the "instrument"4 by "indorsing"5 it and transferring 
possession to Bill's Lounge. Mr. Kihlstrom was under no duty to 
investigate the validity of the check. " [I]n the absence of 
anything to warn him to the contrary, he may assume that persons 
with whom he deals are themselves acting honestly and in good 
faith." Jaeger and Branch, Inc. v. Pappas, 433 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 
1967) . 
Utah law expressly recognizes and protects the status of 
a "holder in due course." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-302 (1997). The 
check at issue here was issued to Mr. Kihlstrom, and did not bear 
such apparent evidence of forgery as to call its authenticity into 
question. Mr. Kihlstrom took the instrument for value (his 
mechanic services), in good faith, without notice that the maker's 
signature was unauthorized. He is a holder in due course. 
The State put on no evidence establishing satisfaction of 
the intent element required by § 76-6-501(1), that the act be 
committed "with purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that 
3See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-201 (1997). 
4See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-104 (1997). 
5See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-204 (1997). 
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he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone." No 
reasonable inferences exist to establish that element. Mr. 
Kihlstrom used his own name, identification, and fingerprint. A 
reasonable person possessing a check made out to himself as payee 
will either negotiate that check for cash, or deposit it into a 
bank account he owns. "The act of passing as true an instrument is 
not one from which guilty knowledge can be inferred." Albrecht v. 
State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 102 (Tex. Cr. App. 1972). "Indeed, to hold 
otherwise would create the danger that the unknowing and accidental 
passing of a forged instrument could effectively become a strict 
liability offense." Parks v. State, 746 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. Cr. 
App. 1987) (en banc). 
There are finite limits to the intent that may be 
inferred from the commission of an act: 
"The law can presume the intention so far as realized in 
the act, but not an intention beyond what was so 
realized. The law does not presume, because an assault 
was made with a weapon likely to produce death, that it 
was an assault with the intent to murder. And where it 
takes a particular intent to constitute a crime, that 
particular intent must be proved either by direct or 
circumstantial evidence, which would warrant the 
inference of the intent with which the act was done. " 
Thacker[v. Commonwealth, 114 S.E. 504, 505 (Va. 1922).] 
This Court has in the past acknowledged the 
fact that criminal intent is seldom proved by direct 
evidence but must be instead inferred from the 
circumstances of the given facts. Nonetheless, we have 
also cautioned that the act in itself does not raise the 
presumption that it was done with the specific intent 
required to prove the offense. All the circumstances, 
when taken together, must admit of no other reasonable 
hypothesis than that of guilt to warrant conviction. 
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 (1980), and cases cited 
therein. State v. Manus, 93 N.M. 95, 597 P.2d 280 
(1979). See also State v. Whittincrhill. 109 Utah 48, 163 
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P.2d 342 (1945), applying that rationale to an assault 
with intent to rape. 
State v. Castoncruay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983) (emphasis 
added) . 
Here, an alternate reasonable hypothesis is indisputably 
present. Where an individual is the payee on a check, the act of 
negotiating that check by itself permits the innocent inference 
that the individual intended to collect the value of that 
instrument. No knowledge that the instrument is forged may be 
inferred, nor any intent to defraud. 
The evidence here was insufficient as to intent to 
justify submission of the case to the jury. The trial court should 
have granted Mr. Kihlstrom's motion to dismiss. There was no 
evidence from which criminal intent could be inferred. 
A jury verdict is reversed only if ""the evidence . . . 
is [so] sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.'" State 
v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). Here, reasonable minds must have 
entertained a doubt that the check was negotiated to perpetuate a 
fraud, rather than merely as a good faith attempt to collect on a 
negotiable instrument. This Court should reverse, and enter a 
judgment of acquittal. 
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POINT 11. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING 
INSTRUCTION 22, WHICH RELIEVED THE STATE OF 
THE OBLIGATION OF PROVING THAT MR. KIHLSTROM 
KNEW THE CHECK WAS FORGED OR HAD AN INTENT TO 
DEFRAUD. 
Under the forgery statute, one irrefutable element of 
forgery is that the act be committed "with purpose to defraud 
anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1995) . Over 
Mr. Kihlstrom's objection, R. 124:68, --95-6, the trial court 
instructed the jury: 
Intent to defraud is simply a purpose to use a 
false writing as if it were genuine in order to gain some 
advantage. 
A false writing has such an obvious tendency to 
accomplish fraud that you may infer such intent from the 
mere creation of an instrument that is false. 
R. 86. 
This instruction was error. Certainly, "the mere 
creation of an instrument that is false" evidences an intent to 
defraud and knowledge of the forgery on the part of the forger. 
Instruction 22 would be appropriate in any prosecution for common 
law forgery, i.e,. where the person who actually supplied the false 
signature is on trial. Mere creation says nothing about the intent 
of each additional person who comes in contact with the forged 
instrument, and might be charged with uttering a forged instrument. 
This instruction had the effect of permitting the jury to treat 
uttering a forged instrument as a strict liability offense --
intent is inferred from the mere creation of the false writing. 
Anyone coming into contact with the false writing and passing it 
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along, even though innocently done, becomes guilty of uttering a 
forged instrument. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 requires specific 
intent -- "with purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that 
he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone." The jury 
was relieved of its burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The inference created by Instruction 22 is 
unconstitutional: 
[A] criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as 
'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and hence unconstitutional, 
unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance 
that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow 
from the proved fact on which it is made to depend. 
Learv v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 1548, 23 
L.Ed.2d 57 (1969). Citizens routinely receive checks without any 
knowledge or ability to determine if the signatures on them are 
genuine. "[I]n the absence of anything to warn him to the 
contrary, he may assume that persons with whom he deals are 
themselves acting honestly and in good faith." Jaeger and Branch, 
Inc. v. Pappas, 433 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1967) . Nothing about 
Exhibit 1 would place a person of ordinary caution on notice that 
the maker's signature had been forged. 
From the mere existence of a fact, it is not more likely 
than not that the entire world is aware of that fact. Instruction 
22 creates just such an inference, which is not warranted. An 
intent to defraud can only be inferred if the individual has 
knowledge that the instrument is forged. Knowledge of the forgery 
cannot be inferred from the mere existence of the forgery. "The 
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act of passing as true an instrument is not one from which guilty 
knowledge can be inferred." Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 102 
(Tex. Cr. App. 1972) . "Indeed, to hold otherwise would create the 
danger that the unknowing and accidental passing of a forged 
instrument could effectively become a strict liability offense." 
Parks v. State, 746 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987) (en banc) . 
Instruction 22 came from State v. Gonzalez, 822 P. 2d 1214 
(Utah App. 1991). See R. 124:95-6. In Gonzalez, Ms. Gonzalez 
possessed the checkbook of a "Christie Cotner." She made out a 
check, signed "Christie Cotner" to it, and attempted to pay for 
merchandise with it. 822 P. 2d at 1215. The Court cited with 
approval State v. May, 461 P.2d 126, 128 (Id. 1969), quoting the 
language contained in Instruction 22. 
In the context of Gonzalez, where the defendant is the 
maker of the check, such language is eminently reasonable. Having 
just made out the check and signed another person' s name to it, it 
is reasonable to infer an intent to defraud. Similarly, in May the 
defendant forged his father's signature as cosigner on a note so 
that he could obtain a loan. May, 461 P. 2d at 127. The intent to 
defraud may be inferred from his act of forging his father's 
signature. 
This reasoning is inapplicable here. Both Gonzalez and 
May involved what at common law was termed forgery. The instant 
case only involves what at common law was termed uttering a forged 
instrument. In this context, one may still infer that the 
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unidentified forger had an intent to defraud, but no inference may 
be drawn concerning the intent of the utterer, Mr. Kihlstrom. 
Mr. Kihlstrom has been prejudiced. The State presented 
no evidence showing that he actually knew the check was forged. 
The defense theory was that Mr. Kihlstrom received the check as 
payment for work he performed as a self employed mechanic. R. 
125:93-5 (opening statement), 124:28-36, --46, --52. Instruction 
22 permitted the jury to infer criminal intent from the undisputed 
fact that the check was forged. Mr. Kihlstrom was thus convicted 
without any proof that he possessed the necessary criminal mens 
rea. Absent the improper inference permitted by Instruction 22, 
there is a reasonable probability that he would have been 
acquitted. 
POINT III. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
MISCONDUCT IN MISCHARACTERIZING MR. 
KIHLSTROM'S PRIOR TESTIMONY, AND INTRODUCING 
UNSUPPORTED INNUENDO. 
The prosecutor committed repeated misconduct in his 
cross-examination of Mr. Kihlstrom. He introduced unsupported 
innuendo: 
Q Okay. When did you realize that the police 
were looking for you in connection with this check? 
A When I did -- I didn't know anything about this 
until I was arrested on a different warrant. 
Q Well, on this particular case weren't you aware 
in late May or early June that Detective Doug Townsend 
wanted to talk to you in connection with this check? 
A No. 
Q He didn't go to your house? Weren't you living 
with a young woman at the time, a Jenny, is it Tangloon? 
A Tangloon. No, I wasn't, not at that time. 
Q She didn't tell Officer Townsend [sic] that 
they were looking for you in late May or early June? 
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A I haven't talked to her for over a year. 
Q Well, where were you in late May and early 
June? Were you out of state or in state? 
A I was in state. 
Q You were here. Were you ever trying to hide 
from the police in connection with this case? 
A Not at all. 
Q And you say you never learned about the check 
until when? 
A December. 
Q December of 1997? 
A Yes, sir. 
R. 124:40-41. The prosecutor failed to prove up his unsupported 
innuendo with evidence that Mr. Kihlstrom was aware in May or June 
that Detective Townsend was looking for him, that the detective 
went to Mr. Kihlstrom's house, that Mr. Kihlstrom was living with 
Jenny Tangloon, that she told him the detective was looking for 
him, or that he evaded the police. 
Later, the prosecutor mischaracterized Mr. Kihlstrom's 
prior testimony: 
Q How many times did Mike Workman pay you? 
A Two times. 
Q Two times? 
A Yes. 
Q Didn't you just tell the jury it was only one 
time? 
A No. 
MS. REMAL: Objection, Your Honor. That's a 
mischaracterization of the evidence. He answered the 
questions that counsel[] asked. 
THE COURT: Overruled. It's cross-examination. 
Q Didn't you just a few minutes ago tell us that 
that was the only time he ever paid you? 
A No, I didn't. 
Q So now he did pay you twice? 
A Yeah. 
R. 124:47. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a two prong test 
for reversals for improper statements of counsel: 
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The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so 
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case 
is, did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified in considering 
in determining their verdict, and were they, under the 
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced 
by those remarks. 
State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973); accord State v. 
Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984), State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 
(Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds in State v. Roberts, 711 
P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985), State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 
1982), State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976). 
If the conclusion of the jurors is based on their 
weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of 
differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood 
that they will be improperly influenced through remarks 
of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be 
searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the 
evidence. They may be especially susceptible to 
influence, and a small degree of influence may be 
sufficient to affect the verdict. 
State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984). 
A. THE PROSECUTOR DREW THE JURORS' ATTENTION 
TO MATTERS THEY WERE NOT OTHERWISE 
JUSTIFIED IN CONSIDERING. 
Each of the prosecutor's improper comments drew the 
jurors' attention to matters they were not justified in 
considering. His questioning concerning how many times Mr. 
Kihlstrom was paid entirely mischaracterized the actual evidence 
presented. The prosecutor attempted to brand Mr. Kihlstrom a liar 
based on testimony that he never gave. 
The questioning concerning Detective Townsend's efforts 
to contact Mr. Kihlstrom was improper unsupported innuendo. The 
possibility that the jury credited the prosecution with having 
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evidence concerning Mr. Kihlstrom evading the police that it did 
not present at trial is palpable. "The insinuation that other 
evidence exists encourages the jury to determine its verdict based 
upon evidence outside the record and jeopardizes a defendant's 
right to a trial based upon the evidence presented." State v. 
Young, 853 P. 2d 327, 349 (Utah 1993) (finding plain error, but 
failing to find prejudice). 
B. THE OBVIOUSNESS PRONG OF PLAIN ERROR IS 
NOT APPLIED TO UNSUPPORTED INNUENDO 
CLAIMS. 
Unsupported innuendo, while reviewed under the plain 
error standard, 
is a circumstance "when an error not readily apparent to 
the court" does not raise an "insurmountable barrier to 
review." State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 
1989) . . . . Unless we apply this exception, this type 
of error would always escape review under the obviousness 
requirement. 
State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah App.), cert denied, 868 
P. 2d 95 (Utah 1993). At the time the prosecutor introduced the 
unsupported innuendo, defense counsel had no way of knowing that he 
would fail to offer evidence in support in his rebuttal case. An 
objection would have been premature. The obviousness does not 
present a barrier to review here. 
C. MR. KIHLSTROM WAS PREJUDICED. 
Each instance of prosecutorial misconduct attacked and 
impugned the credibility of Mr. Kihlstrom. Absent the 
prosecution's improper argument, there is a reasonable probability 
that the jury would have credited Mr. Kihlstrom's testimony and 
found him not guilty. 
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Critical to Mr. Kihlstrom's defense was maintaining 
credibility with the jury concerning how he came to be in 
possession of the forged check. There was no confession. The 
prosecutor tried to establish that Mr. Kihlstrom lied in his 
testimony concerning the timing of a second check, R. 124:51-2, 
--56, but it is equally likely that Mr. Kihlstrom was just 
confused. The prosecutor's misconduct impugned Mr. Kihlstrom's 
credibility by implying that the State had evidence that he had 
evaded arrest and was lying about whether he knew Detective 
Townsend was looking for him. The prosecutor also implied that Mr. 
Kihlstrom had lied concerning how many times he was paid by Mr. 
Workman. Absent the prosecutor's misconduct, it is more likely 
that Mr. Kihlstrom would have been believed and acquitted. This 
Court should reverse, and remand for further proceedings. 
POINT IV. CUMULATIVELY, THE ERRORS HERE UNDERMINE 
CONFIDENCE IN THE VERDICT. 
Reversal is appropriate if the cumulative effect of 
several errors undermines confidence that a fair trial was had. 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) . Here, the joint 
operation of Instruction 22 and the prosecutor's misconduct 
undermine confidence in the verdict. The prosecutor's misconduct 
undermined Mr. Kihlstrom's credibility, and made it less likely 
that the jury would credit his testimony that he received the 
forged check in good faith for services rendered, without knowledge 
that it was forged. Instruction 22 permitted the jury to infer an 
intent to defraud from Mr. Kihlstrom's innocent receipt of the 
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forged check. Collectively, absent these errors a better result is 
probable. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Kihlstrom respectfully 
requests that this court reverse the trial court's denial of his 
motion to dismiss, and order that a judgment of acquittal be 
entered. Alternatively, Mr. Kihlstrom requests that his conviction 
be reversed, and this matter remanded for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £) day of December, 1998. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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FORGED CHECK (EXHIBIT 1) 
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ADDENDUM B 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT (R. 102-3) 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN KILSTROM, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 971010775 FS 
Judge: RONALD E NEHRING 
Date: June 5, 1998 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lindaps 
Prosecutor: RICH HAMP 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LISA J. REMAL 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 19, 1962 
Video 
Tape Number: 124341 
CHARGES 
1. FORGERY - 3rd Degree Felony-
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 06/05/1998 Guilty 
HEARING 
TAPE: 124341 On record - This matter comes now before the Court for 
Sentencing. 
Defendant is commited to the Utah State Prison forthwith. 
The Court orders Defendant to pay restitution in the amount of 
$2,668.28. 
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Case No: 971010775 
Date: Jun 05, 1998 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 158 day(s) previously served. 
Dated this ;5- day of N / ^ t A ^ 
# 
RONALQ^E^ 
Distroct^C©urt' j£dge 
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